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Abstract 
 
 
 
Cross country comparisons of lifecycle labour supplies show that female hours of market 
work are significantly lower in Australia than in other comparable OECD countries, 
notably, the US, UK and Sweden.  This paper argues that an explanation can be found in 
the rate structure of the Australian family income tax system, in combination with a 
poorly developed and costly childcare sector.  A detailed analysis of marginal and 
average tax rates shows how various policy instruments are used to set rates on the 
income of a second earner, typically the female partner, that reduce her net wage to a 
level that makes it difficult to finance childcare from the additional income. The system 
is also shown to be unfair.  The paper proposes a return to a progressive individual 
income tax, with universal family benefits, together with the development of a high 
quality, education oriented, public sector childcare system.   
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: H24, J22, D91 
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1 Introduction 
 
The economic approach to the evaluation of a given tax system consists of the assessment 
of its effects on the incentives to work, on the one hand, and on the fairness of the 
distribution of burdens it places on individuals and households, on the other. It is well 
established empirically that male labour supplies are actually not sensitive to tax rates, 
whereas female labour supplies are much more so.1 Particularly important in this respect 
are lifecycle effects. Almost all men show over the lifecycle a stable pattern of full time 
employment. On the other hand, after the arrival of children the labour supply of women 
shows on average a substantial decline, but a high degree of heterogeneity. A large 
proportion of women leave the labour force when they have children under school age 
and, at the same time, a significant number with the same wage rates and demographic 
characteristics continue in full time employment. Some of those who leave rejoin later, 
but many remain permanently out of the labour force, continuing to specialise in 
domestic work. This is why discussion of the incentive effects of taxation can justifiably 
focus on its effects on female labour supply, since there is the potential for changes in the 
tax structure to have a very large effect.  
 
The policy relevance of the relationship between tax structure and female labour supply 
should be clear. It is now generally acknowledged that Australia’s rate of economic 
growth and ability to sustain public funding for health, education, and welfare will 
depend crucially on future labour supply and productivity. In 2005 Australia had a labour 
force participation rate of around 64 per cent, quite close, for example, to a UK rate of 63 
per cent and a US rate of 66 per cent, but significantly below Sweden’s rate of 72 per 
cent.  
 
However, participation rate comparisons of this kind can seriously misrepresent labour 
supply variation across OECD countries because they conceal gender differences. Male 
rates in all four countries are relatively high, and vary in a range of only 5 percentage 
                                                 
1 For a survey, see Heckman (1993). 
 3
points. Female rates are significantly lower, and differ by up to 12 percentage points.2  
More importantly, participation rates conceal the high degree of heterogeneity in female 
labour supply, especially among married mothers. Almost all married men are in full time 
work until close to retirement age. In contrast, a significant proportion of married women 
of working age in Australia, the US and UK are either not in the workforce or work part 
time. In Sweden, most work full-time. Consequently, average female hours vary quite 
dramatically across these countries. Hours worked by married women in Australia, the 
US, UK, and Sweden are, respectively, 46, 57, 62 and 75 per cent of those of married 
men.3  Thus we see that Australia does not do well in terms of incentives to work. 
 
Policies that discourage female labour supply not only have a negative effect on the 
earnings component of the tax base in the short term, they can also have negative 
lifecycle effects on human capital acquisition, and therefore on productivity, because they 
reduce the return to education and experience. A wide range of policies, from childcare 
through to in-work welfare programs, could adversely affect not just current behaviour 
but also the whole lifecycle pattern of work, fertility, income and saving for women.4  
 
Superficially, the fairness of a tax system can be related to the degree of progressivity of 
its average rate structure. In this respect the Australian tax system may appear to rate 
quite highly. However, when female labour supply varies significantly across households 
with the same wage rates and demographics, the evaluation of the fairness of the 
distribution of tax burdens becomes a far more subtle issue. Is the tax burden imposed on 
a household determined by its total income from market labour supply? Is total market 
income in fact a good indicator of household well being, good enough, that is, to provide 
the basis for judgments on who should pay more and who should pay less?  For example, 
is a household with young children in which both parents work full time to earn a total 
annual income of, say, $85,000 just as well off as another in which only one parent needs 
to work full time to earn the same household income? A tax system that places an equal 
                                                 
2 The OECD reported male rates are 72, 70, 73 and 75 percent, and female rates, 57, 56, 59 and 69 percent, 
for Australia, the UK, the US and Sweden, respectively, for 2005. 
3 For data sources and further detail see Apps (2006) and Apps and Rees (2005). 
4 See Apps and Rees (2004, 2003) 
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burden on them is implicitly assuming that is the case. In this paper I shall argue that the 
Australian income tax system, defined appropriately to include the personal income tax, 
low income tax offset, Medicare Levy, and Family Tax Benefits Part A and Part B, is 
very close to one in which the tax burden is based on total household income, and that 
this is unfair. 
 
A central thesis of the paper is that the marginal and average tax rate structure of the 
Australian income tax system is fundamentally flawed, in terms both of its incentive 
effects and fairness, due primarily to the withdrawal of FTBs on household income and 
the income of the second earner. The argument is quite straightforward - though 
ostensibly a system based on the progressive taxation of individual incomes, it has 
become a joint tax system, with very high marginal and average tax rates on married 
mothers as second earners across much of the distribution of earnings.  This is a defining 
feature of joint taxation. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I first present lifecycle profiles of 
female and male labour supplies for Australia. For purposes of comparison I include 
profiles for Sweden, as an example of a country with a progressive individual income tax 
and a well-developed system of affordable childcare. Section 3 goes on to document the 
substantial heterogeneity in female labour supply using data for families in which at least 
one parent is employed.  The analysis explains in some detail why household income is 
an unreliable measure of family living standards, and should therefore not be used as the 
basis for withdrawing benefits.  Section 4 presents an analysis of marginal and average 
tax rates on primary and second earners, which makes clear the strong disincentives 
facing married mothers who may wish to go out to work. In Section 5, I present a 
simulation analysis of a reform that would make the Australian income tax system more 
like the Swedish system, and therefore more sustainable in an ageing population. The 
system is one that combines a progressive individual income tax with universal family 
benefits. Section 6 presents concluding comments. 
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2 Lifecycle labour supply 
 
Figure 1a plots female and male labour supply profiles by age, based on weighted data 
means for the full sample of individual records in the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) 2003-04 Survey of Income and Housing (SIH) file.5  The figure shows graphically 
the gap between average female and male hours across the lifecycle, due primarily to a 
low rate of female full time employment.  75.3 per cent of males aged from 20 to 65 
years work full time, whereas only 35.4 per cent of females across this age band are in 
full time employment.  The profiles show a consistent rise in male hours in the early 
years. Female hours first rise but then fall in the early 30s, and never return to their pre-
30s’ level.   
 
The shape of the female profile is obviously associated with children. To isolate the 
effect of children more clearly, Figure 1b presents profiles for a sub-sample that omits 
women under 45 in income units in which no children are present, on the assumption that 
they represent women who have not yet had children. Because younger women who have 
not had children tend to work similar hours to men, omitting them from the sample 
widens the gap between the male and female profiles very significantly in the first half of 
the lifecycle.  With the arrival of children, female hours fall to around a third of male 
hours.  From age 40+, the profiles of the two groups tend to merge because an increasing 
proportion of the sample begins to represent couples whose children have left home.6 
There is no matching variation in male labour supplies.7   
 
A critical feature of the post-child female profile is not so much the sharp fall in hours 
following the arrival of the first child, and the large gap between female and male hours 
that this causes, but the persistence of the gap when the children reach school age and 
                                                 
5 The sample includes all individual apart from a small number of hard to classify records in complex 
households. 
6 As indicated by the decline in the percentage of records in which children are present at around this age.  
See Apps and Rees (2005). 
7 The data indicate the men, with and without children, tend to work the same number of hour on average in 
each age group. 
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after they leave home. Average female hours never rise again to much above 50 per cent 
of male hours.  
 
Figure 1a  Labour supplies by gender 
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Figure 1b Post-child labour supplies by gender  
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Also of concern is the fact that the majority of women are either non-participants or in 
full-time employment, as the section to follow will show in more detail.  Panel data 
studies, for example, those for the US where female labour supply also exhibits a high 
degree of heterogeneity, find strong evidence of persistence in female labour supply 
choices across the lifecycle,8 and explain it as an effect of past labour supply on current 
wages and marginal utilities of non-market time.9  Thus, not only does the withdrawal of 
                                                 
8 A phenomenon that led Shaw (1994) to observe that: “...women tend to be either workers or non-
workers”. 
9 For studies estimating structural models of married women’s labour force participation decision with 
endogenous human capital, see also Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Altug and Miller (1998). 
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married mothers from the workforce in the early child-rearing years lead to a large fall in 
labour supply at that time, it also causes a fall in female labour productivity which then 
continues to have a negative effect on female hours throughout the lifecycle. The 
consequences of policies that discourage mothers from working in the early years are 
therefore likely to be difficult to reverse for decades to come.10 
 
Similar results are obtained for married couples.  Figures 2a and 2b present matching 
profiles for the 6953 couple income units in the ABS 2003-04 SIH file.  Female labour 
supply rises in the early years because many couples delay the first child.  If we remove 
these records, again we find a much larger gap between female and male market hours.   
 
Figure 2a Labour supplies of couples by gender 
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Figure 2b  Post-child labour supplies of couples by gender 
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10 Attanasio et al. (2003) study the lifecycle labour supply of three cohorts of American women: those born 
in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s and find large shifts in the labour supply behaviour of these cohorts. Their 
study highlights the potential sensitivity of female labour supply to the cost of childcare. 
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 To give an indication of the extent to which female labour supply may be driven by 
public policy, Figures 3a and 3b present male and female labour supply profiles of 
couples for Sweden,11 a country notable for its system of individual taxation and a well 
developed childcare sector. 
  
     Figure 3a Sweden: Labour supplies of couples by gender 
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    Figure 3b Sweden: Post-child labour supplies of couples by gender 
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The Swedish profile of female hours is, as is well known, much higher than the 
Australian profile.  Note also that the Swedish profiles for both females and males 
continue at a higher level in the later phases of the lifecycle.  The differences between the 
two countries in the pre-retirement age groups reflect the tendency towards early 
retirement in households in which the female partner has remained out of the workforce. 
                                                 
11 For data sources and further detail, see Apps (2006). 
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 The central proposition of this paper is that low average female hours after the arrival of 
the first child and the high degree of heterogeneity evident in the Australian data are due 
primarily to family tax policy together with the failure of successive governments to 
develop an efficient and affordable public sector childcare system.12  The results 
presented in the sections to follow support the thesis that family tax policy has strongly 
inhibited the reallocation of female time to the market, during a period in which we 
would expect a fall in demand for domestic labour due to the fall in fertility.   
 
3 Female labour supply heterogeneity and welfare rankings 
 
If families with the same wage rates and demographic characteristics were observed to 
make the same time allocation decisions, then, all else being equal, we could reasonably 
expect to find a strong correlation between household income and family living 
standards. Under these conditions, a progressive tax on joint income would not 
necessarily be unfair in terms of its distribution of burdens across households. It would, 
of course, discriminate against the second earner, but not against two-earner households.   
 
However, with heterogeneity in the labour supply of one parent, typically the mother, this 
is no longer the case.  Furthermore, the problem of errors in a welfare ranking defined on 
household income becomes especially serious when, as the analysis to follow will show, 
the profile of male wage earnings for full time work is relatively flat across the middle of 
the distribution and then rises sharply towards the top. 
 
The analysis draws on data for a sample of 1945 “in-work” families from the ABS 2003-
04 SIH.  The sample is selected on the criteria that the family is a couple income unit 
with dependent children and at least one parent is employed.  Families in which both 
parents are unemployed or out of the workforce are excluded in order to focus on the 
personal income tax and FTB system rather than on the wider welfare system. This 
                                                 
12 The negative effects on female labour supply of reducing the progressivity of the personal income tax 
and withdrawing benefits on family income are estimated in Apps (1991) using the parameters of a labour 
supply model estimated on Australian unit record data.  
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excludes very few records.  While around 2.5 per cent of all parents in the full sample of 
two-parent families are unemployed, only a quarter of one per cent of families reports 
both parents as unemployed.13  The sample is also limited to families in which at least 
one parent earns above $15,000 per annum, earnings are principally from wages and 
salaries, and neither parent has a negative income from investments or unincorporated 
enterprises.  All incomes are indexed to the 2006-07 financial year.  
 
The parent with the higher private income is defined as the “primary earner”. Private 
income is income from all non-government sources such as wages and salaries, profits, 
investment income and superannuation (see ABS, 2005).  The primary earner is the male 
partner in over 87 per cent of records in the sample and therefore in the discussion to 
follow the second earner will frequently be referred to as the female partner. 
 
Table 1 reports primary and second earnings and the employment status of the second 
earner across a quintile ranking defined on the income of the primary earner, labelled 
“primary income”. From the table we can see that the profile of primary hours is 
relatively flat, reflecting the fact that the vast majority of primary earners are male and 
almost all work full time.  In contrast, the labour supply of second earners exhibits a very 
high degree of heterogeneity, with 29.7 per cent in full-time work, 36.4 per cent working 
part time and 33.8 per cent reporting zero hours.  
 
Table 1  Earnings and employment status of “in-work” families, by primary income 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Primary income $pa 31004 43680 54445 67417 120055 63447 
Primary earnings $pa 30739 42972 53831 65677 114523 61663 
Primary labour supply, hrs pa 2094 2252 2298 2373 2527 2309 
%Primary earners employed FT 84.6 94.1 94.0 97.6 96.9 93.4 
Second earnings $pa 11185 17809 20560 23344 22978 19159 
Second labour supply, hrs pa 887 1107 1105 1167 1001 1053 
% Second earner employed PT 25.4 34.6 32.2 30.8 25.6 29.7 
% Second earner employed FT 29.9 34.4 37.4 42.2 38.1 36.4 
 
                                                 
13 Of male partners in the full sample of families, 83.6 per cent are in full-time work, 6.7 per cent are in 
part-time work and 2.5 per cent are unemployed.  In contrast, only 27.9 per cent of married mothers are in 
full-time employment.  37.6 per cent are in part-time work and 2.3 per cent report being unemployed. 
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Table 2 presents labour supply means for the sample partitioned into three household 
types:  
Type H1: single-earner households 
Type H2 PT: two-earner households with the second earner in part-time work 
Type H2 FT: two-earner households with the second earner in full-time work. 
 
Figure 4 plots the profiles to show graphically the contrasting labour supply behaviour of 
primary and second earners.  Since the female is the second earner in the vast majority of 
households, the results reflect the high degree of heterogeneity in the market hours of 
married mothers across the entire distribution of male earnings. The variation is, in fact, 
quite extreme. Married mothers employed full time work almost the same hours as males.  
Those employed part time work less than half the hours of males. 
 
Table 2 Household labour supplies by primary income 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Type H1       
Primary market hours pa 2062 2240 2346 2380 2531 2296 
Type H2 PT       
Primary market hours pa  2154 2315 2318 2382 2532 2351 
Second market hours pa 1050 1098 1064 1155 1054 1088 
Type H2 FT       
Primary market hours pa 2078 2201 2229 2354 2512 2272 
Second market hours pa 2256 2104 2196 2209 2342 2231 
 
 
 
Figure 4    Household labour supplies by primary income 
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In contrast to the observed diversity of female labour supply choices, time use data show 
that male and female total hours of work – market plus domestic – are, on average, 
closely matching (see Apps and Rees, 2005).   Married mothers employed full time are 
found to work longer hours than their male partners, and also longer than their 
counterparts in the other two household types, but only in the order of 3 to 4 per cent 
longer. Much of the time allocated to domestic work is childcare, and so time use data 
provide evidence of strong substitution of household for market production by the female 
partner: mothers who withdraw from market work spend long hours providing childcare 
and related services that they would need to buy-in, or obtain though some kind of 
extended family arrangement, if they went out to work. 
 
Table 3 presents the quintile profiles of primary and second earnings for each household 
type.  Figure 5 depicts the profiles graphically.  Given that there is little variation in 
primary hours across types, the closely matching primary income profiles indicate that 
male wage rates do not vary significantly across types.  Thus variation in female labour 
supply within each quintile cannot be attributed to male wage rates.  Nor can it be 
explained adequately by demographics. The average number of dependent children in the 
H1 household is 1.9, in the H2 PT household, 1.8 and in the H2 FT household, 1.7. 
 
A crucial feature of the profiles of primary earnings is the relatively flat segment across 
quintiles 2 to 4.  This means that the position of a family in a ranking defined on 
household income will be very sensitive to the earnings, and therefore to the labour 
supply, of the second earner because it will take only a small increase in earnings to shift 
a family from a low percentile of family income to a significantly higher point in the 
distribution.   
 
This is illustrated in Table 4.  The table gives the data means for household income, 
followed by the quintile distributions of the three household types, H1, H2 PT and H2 
FT.  As we would expect, the vast majority of single-earner families are ranked in the 
lower quintiles.  The upper limit of quintile 1 is $48,620, and that of quintile 3 is $83,375.  
Thus a single earner family with an income of, say, $45,000 will be located in quintile 1. 
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 Table 3 Primary and second earnings by primary income, 2006-07 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Type H1       
1. Primary earnings $pa 30744 43103 54238 67291 126591 63702 
Type H2 PT       
2. Primary earnings $pa 30150 42764 53838 64392 112625 62737 
3. Second earnings $pa 15121 19337 20642 22995 22890 20501 
Type H2 FT       
4. Primary earnings $pa 31427 43062 53437 66027 100255 58014 
5. Second earnings $pa 20861 30771 35843 41886 47441 35351 
  
 
 
      Figure 5  Primary and second earnings by h’hold type and primary income  
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If the family switches to Type H2 with the second earner  working full time to earn, say, 
$40,000, the family will move from quintile 1 to quintile 4.  If the household has a 
preschool child, much of the net second income might be spent on childcare. Clearly, 
such a household could not be said to have the same standard of living as another in 
which only one parent works full time to earn $85,000 while the other works full time at 
home. To argue to the contrary it is necessary to assume that home childcare makes little 
to no contribution to family welfare.    
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Table 4:  Household type by household income 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Household income $pa 37020 57812 74533 94212 153711 84117 
Type H1 % 67.1 43.0 23.1 15.3 21.6 33.9 
Type H2 PT % 22.0 40.0 42.0 41.6 36.6 36.4 
Type H2 FT % 10.9 17.0 35.0 43.1 41.8 29.7 
 
 
The fundamental deficiency of a household incomes ranking is that it is defined on an 
income variable that omits home production, appropriately weighted by price. The 
ranking is driven by the labour supply of the second earner, and is therefore negatively 
correlated with time allocated to domestic work. 
 
4 Family income tax system  
 
This section compares tax burdens and marginal and average rates on individual and 
household incomes set by four key policy instruments of the Australian family income 
tax system: the personal income tax rate schedule, low income tax offset (LITO), 
Medicare Levy (ML), and Family Tax Benefits Part A (FTB-A) and Part B (FTB-B).14 
The analysis is based on data for the sample of in-work families described above. 
 
Table 5, row 1 of the upper panel, reports data means for the incomes families would 
have if the second earner withdrew from work, by quintiles of primary income. The next 
row shows the average amount of income tax, including the LITO and ML, families 
would pay on that income. The third row shows their net tax, obtained by subtracting 
FTBs from the income tax figures in row 2. The average tax rate (ATR) in row 4 is 
calculated as the ratio of net tax to the average income that families would have if only 
one parent went out to work, expressed as a percentage.  Row 1 of the lower panel gives 
the data means for second earnings and rows 2 to 3 report the income tax, net tax and 
ATRs on second earnings, calculated as the increment in tax due to the second parent 
going out to work. 
                                                 
14 Child Care Benefit is not included. This is unlikely to alter the findings, given that the available unit 
record data on government direct and indirect benefits for childcare indicate that, overall, they tends to be 
distributed independently of employment status. 
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  Table 5   In-work families: Tax burdens and rates, by primary income  
Quintile – primary income 1 2 3 4 5 All 
All households as single-earner families      
1. Family  income $pa 31556 44759 55087 68775 123936 64958 
2. Income tax (+LITO+ML) $pa  3395 8214 11487 15562 35662 14911 
3. Net tax $pa -7401 -1669 2929 8353 30760 6648 
4. ATR  % -23.6 -3.7 5.3 12.1 24.8 10.3 
Second earnings and additional tax on second earnings   
1. Second earnings $pa 11185 17809 20560 23344 22978 19159 
2. Income tax (+LITO+ML) $pa 1609 2873 3434 3971 4661 3308 
3. Net tax $pa 3871 6314 6538 7197 7425 6266 
4. ATR on second earnings % 34.6 35.4 31.8 30.8 32.3 32.7 
 
A striking feature of the results is the dramatic increase in the tax burden on the second 
earnings when FTBs are included.  Comparing the income tax figures in row 2 of each 
panel, we can see that the share of the burden of income taxes (including the LITO and 
ML) on the second earnings in only 18.2 per cent.  This is because the marginal tax rate 
(MTR) schedule of the personal income tax and LITO applies to individual incomes, and 
second earners typically have low incomes.  The ML has little effect.  However, when we 
include FTBs, the share rises to over 48.5 per cent.    
 
The average net tax on family incomes is $12,914, the sum of the amount that would be 
payable if the second earner worked at home, $6,648, and the additional net tax payable 
when she goes out to work, $6,266.  Thus, if all families had only one earner or, 
equivalently, if all second earners withdrew from market work, the average net tax per 
family in the sample would fall from $12,914 pa to $6,648 pa, that is, by over 48.5 per 
cent.  The dramatic rise in the family’s tax burden when the second earner goes out to 
work is reflected in the very high ATRs on her earnings.  The overall ATR on an average 
income of $64,958 pa, is only 10.3 per cent.  The overall ATR on second earnings, which 
average only $19,159, is 32.7 per cent.   
 
ATRs on single-earner family incomes are not only low on average but also progressive.  
We have a negative income tax up to the second quintile, with those in quintile 1 
receiving a net transfer that averages $7,401 pa.  The ATR rises to 5.3 per cent in quintile 
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3 and then to 24.8 per cent in quintile 5.  This progressive taxation of the single earner 
contrasts with the treatment of the second earner.  The profile of ATRs on her earnings 
tends to be regressive, with the highest rate of 35.4 per cent in the second quintile where 
average earnings are only $17,809 pa.     
 
Because the table reports average tax burdens on all second incomes, the figures conceal 
wide variation in burdens across household types. To indicate how taxes depend on the 
labour supply of the second earner, Table 6 presents results for the sample again 
partitioned into the three types: Type H1, Type H2 PT and Type H3 FT, as in Tables 2 
and 3.  The overall data means in the final column show that the second earner in FT 
work contributes almost twice as much to tax revenue as her counterpart in PT work. 
Thus, much of the additional revenue from second earners comes from those in FT work.   
 
Table 6 Tax burdens, ATRs and employment status, by primary income  
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Type H1       
Family income $pa 34360 46454 59317 72454 142406 70417 
Net tax $pa -7225 -2188 3245 8715 37807 7825 
ATR H1 % -21.0 -4.7 5.5 12.4 26.5 11.1 
Type H2 PT       
Family income $pa 46147 64184 76065 90748 143742 86621 
Second earnings $pa 15121 19337 20642 22995 22890 20501 
Tax on second earnings $a 4956 7115 6692 6602 7052 6537 
ATR2  H2 PT % 32.8 36.8 32.4 28.7 30.8 31.9 
Net household tax $a -2425 5612 9379 14599 36738 13723 
ATRH H2 PT % -5.2 8.7 12.3 16.1 25.6 15.8 
Type H2 FT       
Family income $pa 53473 75351 90595 111271 158030 96708 
Second earnings $pa 20861 30771 35843 41886 47441 35351 
Tax on second earnings $a 7620 10509 11376 13536 15186 11639 
ATR2  H2 FT % 36.5 34.2 31.7 32.3 32.0 32.9 
Net household tax $a 1673 9787 15481 22858 40877 17739 
ATRH H2 FT % 3.1 13.0 17.0 20.5 25.9 18.3 
 
The highest ATR in the table, that of 36.8 per cent, applies to the incomes of PT second 
earners in quintile 2, where the average second income is less than $20,000 pa. What this 
means is that a married mother in quintile 2 who decides to work part time in the market 
rather than full time at home will, on average, earn a little less $20,000 and lose around 
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37 per cent in taxes and reduced FTBs. She will also contribute more to GST revenue, 
because her additional income will be spent at least partly on GST rated goods and 
services as substitutes for those she could produce herself by working full time at home.  
 
The high tax rates on the second earner have the effect of equaliing tax burdens across 
single and two-earner families with the same joint income.  Compare, for example, the 
ATRs of the FT two-earner family in quintile 2, the PT two-earner family in quintile 3 
and the single earner family in quintile 4.  All three have close to the same incomes, 
$75,351, $76,065 and $72,454, respectively, and close to the same ATRs, 13.0 per cent, 
12.3 per cent and 12.4 per cent, respectively.   
 
These results reflect the Howard Government's shift towards a system of joint taxation, 
through successive increases in joint and second income targeted family benefits, 
together with changes in personal income tax rates that reduce progressivity and therefore 
shift the burden towards low and average wage workers.  The latter include the vast 
majority of employed married mothers.   
 
Diagrammatic exposition of the structure of MTRs and ATRs  
 
This section identifies the fundamental limitations of the rate structure of the Australian 
family tax system by comparing the treatment of single and two-earner families, which I 
now label simply Type H1 and Type H2, each with two children, one aged under 5 and 
the other under 12 years.  Male partners in both types and the female partner in H2 are 
assumed to work the same full time hours in the market and the female partner in H1 to 
work full time at home. Both households have zero non-labour incomes.  
 
I present MTR and ATR profiles by primary and household income, for two cases:  
• Case 1:  All partners face the same gross wage rate.  Thus both household types 
have the same primary income and H2 has twice the joint income of H1. 
 
• Case 2: The single earner in H1 has twice the gross wage rate of partners in H2, 
and so the two family types have the same household incomes but H2 must work 
twice the number of market hours as H1 to earn that income. 
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 Case 1:  H1 and H2 – tax rate profiles by primary income 
 
Table 7 reports taxes, FTBs, and the MTRs and ATRs on primary and second incomes, as 
primary income rises from $31,000 to $115,000 pa in steps that are rounded figures for 
the quintile data means in Table 1.  Row 1 in the upper panel shows net taxes, rows 2, 3 
and 4, income taxes (including the LITO), ML and FTBs, respectively.  Rows 5 and 6 
report MTRs and ATRs for H1. The profiles can be interpreted to apply to the primary 
earner’s income in both household types under the assumption that the household first 
decides on the primary earner’s labour supply and then chooses the labour supply of the 
second partner, as implied in the preceding analysis.  The subsequent rows show the tax 
treatment of the second earner, calculated again as the increase in the family’s tax burden 
when the mother switches from home to market work, that is, when the Type H1 
household switches to Type H2. 
 
Table 7 Tax burdens and rates by primary income – 2-child family 
 Primary earnings ~ quintiles 31000 43000 54000 66000 115000 
Type H1      
1. Net tax $pa -7813 -2608 3057 9015 32108 
2. Income tax (+LITO) $pa 4290 8250 11550 15150 33850 
3. ML $pa 0 645 810 990 1725 
4. FTB-A and FTB-B $pa 12103 11503 9303 7215 3468 
5. MTR H1 % 34.0 51.1 51.1 31.5 41.5 
6. ATR H1 % -25.0 -6.1 5.7 13.7 27.9 
Type H2      
7. Net tax on second earnings $pa 13088 16741 21663 23233 39042 
8. Income tax (+LITO) on sec. earn. $pa 4290 8250 11550 15150 33850 
9. ML on second earnings $pa 930 645 810 990 1725 
10. FTB-A and FTB-B $pa 4236 3657 0 0 0 
11. MTR H2 % 55.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 41.5 
12. ATR2 H2 % 42.2 38.9 40.1 35.2 34.0 
13. ATR  H2 % 8.7 16.4 22.9 24.5 30.9 
 
 
The figures for income tax in rows 2 and 8 are the same for primary and second earners 
in each quintile, as we would expect under an individual tax system.  When the ML is 
included tax burdens differ in quintile 1 only, where the second earner pays an additional 
$930 because she not only has to pay the ML on her income but has to repay the 
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exemption on the primary earner’s income.15  The family’s FTBs fall from $12,103 to 
$4236.  Thus, in quintile 1, the second earner pays $4290 in income taxes, $930 ML, and 
loses $7,867 in FTBs.  In quintile 3, FTBs of $9,303 for H1 are entirely lost by H2 when 
the second parent goes out to work for the same income.  As a result she pays a total of 
$21,663 in tax, which is over 40 per cent of her earnings.  Only when each parent’s 
income is near the top of the distribution does the system begin to exhibit the rate 
structure of an individual tax system, with both partners paying close the same amount in 
net tax.   
 
Table 8 list the MTRs that apply to primary and second incomes under the personal 
income MTR schedule and LITO.  The LITO raises the zero rated threshold to $10,000 
and the MTR on income from $25,001 to $40,000 from 30 cents to 34 cents in the dollar.  
The LITO is in fact an entirely redundant policy instrument that serves only to reduce the 
transparency of the true MTR schedule, as listed in Table 8.   
 
 Table 8 MTR schedule + LITO  
Individual income tax bands MTR  (+ LITO) 
$0 - $10,000 
$10,001 - $25,000 
$25,001 - $40,000 
$40,001 - $75,000 
$75,001 - $150,000 
$150,000 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.34 
0.30 
0.40 
0.45 
 
The MTRs in Table 8 are depicted graphically in Figure 6a for each household type, by 
primary income.  Since the tax base is individual income, and both partners have the 
same income, the graph shows a single MTR profile. This contrasts with Figure 6b, 
which plots the MTRs that apply to the incomes of primary and second earners when the 
ML and FTB system are included.  The gap between profiles reflects the higher marginal 
rates on the second income up to the point where the base rate of FTB-A has been 
entirely withdrawn. 
 
                                                 
15 A primary income of $31,000 is below the lower joint income limit of $33,435 for the ML reduction for a 
family with two dependent children. The upper income limit is $39,335.  Because the ML reduction is 
withdrawn on joint income, it is partly a joint income tax. 
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Figure 6a MTR schedule + LITO 
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             Figure 6b  MTR schedule + LITO + ML + FTBs 
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Figure 6c ATRs: MTR schedule + LITO + ML + FTBs 
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
  
AT
R
0 50000 100000 150000
Primary income
ATRH H1 ATR2 H2
ATRH H2
 
 
 21
Figure 6c graphs the resulting ATR profiles. The profile for the second earner, ATR2, is 
well above that for the single-earner household, ATRH H1, up to around the upper 
income limit for the base rate of FTB-A, $104,317.  As a result the ATR profile for the 
two-earner household, ATRH H2, is well above that of the single-earner household, 
ATRH H1, up to the same point.  A gap of this kind between primary and second earner 
ATR profiles is consistent with a system of joint taxation.  Taxing families on joint 
income, or allowing income splitting, discriminates against the second earner, by 
applying the MTR on the primary earner’s last dollar of income to the first dollar of the 
second earner. And because she faces a higher MTR, she has a higher ATR. The 
withdrawal of FTBs on joint and second income has the same effect. 
 
Average tax rates on the second earnings exceed 40 per cent across much of the middle of 
the distribution of household income.  Among the more seriously disadvantaged are two-
earner families with each parents earning around $52,000-$54,000 for full-time work, 
that is, around AWE.  They pay twice as much in personal income taxes as the single-
earner family also on AWE, and they are denied FTBs.  
 
Case 2: H1 and H2 – tax profiles by household income 
 
Table 9 presents tax burdens and rates for the two household types, as household income 
rises from $37,000 to $154,000 in steps that are rounded figures for the quintile data 
means in Table 4.  Figures 7a and 7b plot the ATRs and MTRs across household income.  
In this case, the critical result to note is that the two household types have close to the 
same ATR profiles, consistent with joint taxation, from quintiles 1 to 4.  The result is 
illustrated graphically in Figure 7b, where the very high average tax rate profile for the 
second earner, ATR2 H2, raises the average rate for the H2 household, ATR H2, to a 
level that is only slightly below that for the H1 household, ATRH H1, up to around the 
upper income limit of the base rate of FTB-A.  In fact, at very low household income 
levels, the ATR for the two-earner household is slightly above that of the single-earner 
household, due to a higher MTR on the second income, as shown in Figure 7a.  This 
anomaly is created by the withdrawal of FTB-B on her income alone. 
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 Table 9 Tax burdens and tax rates by household income – 2-child family 
Household income ≈ quintiles 37000 58000 75000 94000 154000 
Type H1      
1. Household net tax burden $pa -5326 5117 11850 20297 48492 
2. MTR % 44.0 51.5 41.5 71.5 46.5 
3. ATRH % -14.2 8.9 15.8 21.6 31.5 
Type H2      
5. Tax on second earnings $pa 4576 11548 15574 17763 26930 
6. MTR % 45.0 55.5 25.5 61.5 41.5 
7. ATR2 % 24.7 39.8 41.5 37.8 35.0 
8. ATRH % -16.7 5.3 14.0 18.3 25.7 
 
            
 
Figure 7a   MTRs by household income 
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
  
M
TR
0 50000 100000 150000
Household income
MTR H1 MTR H2
 
 
 
Figure 7b   ATRs by household income 
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Equivalence to joint taxation 
 
The preceding analysis illustrates graphically how targeting of FTBs on joint and second 
income transforms the Australian individual income tax into one of joint taxation of 
families up to around $100,000 of primary income.  The system can be shown to be 
equivalent to one that combines universal FTBs with the joint taxation of family incomes 
under a rate schedule that exhibits and inverted U-shaped profile.     
 
To demonstrate this, I take Case 1 and recalculate tax burdens and rates for a system of 
joint taxation under which families receive FTB-A and FTB-B as universal payments and 
face a new marginal rate schedule on joint income.  The new schedule is listed in Table 
10.  The first column of the table lists the household income bands to which the rates 
apply.  A key point to note is that the new MTR schedule has an inverted U-shaped 
profile. The highest MTR of 44 cents in the dollar applies to family incomes from 
$25,000 to $40,000. 
 
          Table 10    Effective joint taxation of families  
Household income  
Tax bands 
 
MTR  
$0 - $10,000 
$10,001 - $25,000 
$25,001 - $40,000 
$40,001 - $75,000 
$75,001 - $150,000 
$150,000 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.44 
0.40 
0.40 
0.35 
 
The MTR and ATR profiles are depicted graphically in Figures 8a and 8b. Note that the 
MTR schedule for the second earner in Figure 8a is to the left of that of the primary 
earner, a classic feature of joint taxation.  The crucial outcome of this is that the ATR 
profiles in Figure 8b closely match those in Figure 6c up to around $100,000.  This shows 
that the two systems are closely equivalent up to this income level. The result also serves 
to demonstrate that it makes no sense to argue that universal payments are unaffordable, 
since the current system is equivalent to one which has, in effect, universal family 
payments.   
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        Figure 8a MTRs under joint taxation 
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        Figure 8b ATRs under joint taxation 
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Many studies overlook the distributional limitations of joint taxation because they fail to 
recognise the economic implications of female labour supply heterogeneity. The 
literature states consistently, and correctly, that if male labour supply is also endogenous, 
both partners face the same marginal rate under a system of joint taxation. It is also 
accepted that, in a model that treats the primary earner’s labour supply as given, the MTR 
on the first dollar earned by a married mother as second earner is the rate applying to the 
last dollar earned by her husband.  Thus the literature recognises that joint taxation 
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discriminates against married women in general.16  However it is less well recognised 
that there is discrimination against the two-earner family at any given level of household 
income. 
 
The deficiencies of the literature in this context can be traced to the limitations of the 
standard labour supply model. Under the assumptions of that model on the determinants 
of time use decisions – exogenous wage rates, non-labour incomes and demographics - 
the two household types, H1 and H2 in Case 1, cannot coexist other than as random error 
or as an outcome of preference heterogeneity.17 The latter rules out welfare comparisons.  
However, households may have identical preferences, and the welfare of those with the 
same household incomes may therefore differ widely depending on factors, such as 
access to affordable childcare or productivity of domestic work,18 that determine labour 
supply choices.  These factors must be incorporated in into any labour supply or time 
allocation model to obtain reliable estimates of the effects of changes in policy variables. 
 
5 Reform: progressive individual taxation  
 
This section proposes a reform comprising a progressive individual income tax with 
universal family benefits and presents estimates of the additional revenue per household 
that would be generated if, as a result of lower tax rates, female earnings rose to around 
50 per cent of male earnings.  As a first round effect, that is, ignoring human capital 
effects on wage rates, an increase in female earnings to this level would require a rise in 
female hours to around 70 per cent of male hours.  Note that at 70 per cent Australia 
would still lag behind Sweden by five percentage points.  Incorporating the wage effects 
of gains in labour productivity, from increased work experience and incentive to invest in 
education, would obviously lower the required rise in female hours or, alternatively, lead 
to a significantly greater increase in tax revenue than the estimate reported below.  
 
                                                 
16 See Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) and Feldstein and Feenberg (1996). 
17 See, for example, the specification of labour supply models in tax reform analysis by Blundell et al. and 
others.  Studies using panel data specify unobserved fixed effects, following the Heckman (1981) approach. 
For a survey see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).   
18 See Apps and Rees (1999a,b).  
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The reform combines FTB-A as a universal payment with the 2006-07 MTR schedule 
modified as follows. The low income tax offset is dropped and the upper income limit of 
the tax free threshold is lifted to $10,000.  The ML is applied as a constant rate above this 
tax free threshold. The simulation is run on a dataset that combines the sample of 1945 
families described in the preceding sections with a sample of 1604 couples without 
children selected from the ABS 2003-04 SIH on the same “in-work” and income criteria.  
Including couples without children allows for some adjustment for lifecycle effects, 
especially in the phases after the children have left home.  Table 11 gives a summary of 
the results for the two samples and for all records. 
 
 Table 11   Pre- and post-reform tax burdens and rates  
 Couples with 
children 
Couples without 
children 
All 
Net household tax $pa    
Pre-reform $pa 12914 16902 14679 
Post reform $pa 12638 19634 15735 
Change in tax revenue/income unit $pa  -256 2732 1056 
Post-reform    
Income tax on primary income $pa  14397 12471 13544 
Second earnings $pa 26946 32775 29526 
Income tax on second earnings $pa 6130 7650 6803 
ATR on second earnings % 21.2 21.7 21.4 
 
 
 
The first two rows report pre- and post-reform average net tax per household and the 
third row shows the net gain or loss. Overall, the reform raises additional tax revenue of 
$1,056 per household.  Although there is a small revenue loss from families with 
children, this is more than offset by gains later in the lifecycle, as indicated by the results 
for couples without children.  In the longer term the loss is unlikely to persist, as already 
noted.  The potential for productivity gains is clear from the hours and earnings profiles 
in Figures 4 and 5.  Both parents in the Type H2 FT household work close to the same 
full-time hours yet there is a large gap between their earning across the distribution, 
which is reflection of a significant wage gap. This gap can be expected to close over time 
as female labour supply rises.  
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The lower panel of Table 11 reports average income tax burdens on primary and second 
incomes.  The burden on primary income in the sample of families with children is 
approximately the same as under the present system.  The burden on the second income is 
significantly higher.  However, second earnings rise significantly and so ATRs on post-
reform second earnings are much lower, an outcome we would expect from a reform that 
replaces joint taxation by a progressive individual income tax.  The reform changes 
fundamentally the MTR and ATR profiles for the two household types, as illustrated for 
Case 1 below. 
 
Case 1: Tax rate profiles by primary income 
 
Figures 9a plots the primary income profile of MTRs that apply to H1 and H2 households 
under the reform.  There is a single profile for both types because the tax base is 
individual income and benefits for children are universal.  Figure 9b plots the ATR 
profile for couples without children. The two household types face the same ATRs at any 
given income because they face the same MTR schedule and there are no universal 
benefits.  This contrasts with the ATR profiles for couples with children depicted in 
Figure 9c.  The ATR profile for H2 is above that for H1 because both household types 
receive the same benefit but do not contribute equally to tax revenue. The H2 household 
pays twice as much tax at any given level of primary income.   
 
The contrasting profiles in Figures 9b and 9c serve to highlight again the tax policy 
implications of female labour supply heterogeneity.  Even when the tax base is individual 
income, the H2 household contributes more to tax revenue at any given level of primary 
income.  In effect, the single-earner family avoids tax on a second income by switching 
from taxed market work to untaxed home production and childcare.  An advantage of a 
progressive individual income tax is that the additional tax paid by H2 is smaller than 
under joint taxation.  This is illustrated by the wider gap between the ATR profiles for H1 
and H2 in Figure 6c than in Figure 9c, up to around $100,000 where the current system 
tends to revert to individual taxation. 
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              Figure 9a All couples: MTRs of reform 
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Figure 9b      Couples without children: ATRs of reform 
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    Figure 9c      Couples with children: ATRs of reform 
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6 Concluding comment 
 
Cross country comparisons of lifecycle labour supplies by gender show that female hours 
of market work, as opposed to domestic work, are significantly lower in Australia than in 
other comparable OECD countries, notably, the US, UK and Sweden.  This paper has 
argued that an explanation can be found in the rate structure of the Australian family tax 
system, in combination with a poorly developed and costly childcare sector.  The study 
explains how the tax system creates severe disincentives for female labour supply across 
much of the distribution of income, by lowering the net wage of the second earner to a 
level that makes it difficult to finance childcare from the additional income.   
 
High tax rates on second earners are a characteristic of joint income taxation. In a 
detailed analysis of the structure of marginal and average rates I have shown how various 
policy instruments are used to create a system that is closely equivalent to the joint 
taxation of family income under a MTR schedule that exhibits an inverted U-shaped 
profile, combined with universal FTBs.  A system of this kind is widely recognised to 
have strong negative effects on female labour supply and productivity, and therefore on 
the future tax base for funding family support.  
 
The fundamental limitation of the system is not the level of family benefits,19 but rather 
the inverted U-shaped profile of MTRs on joint income.  Taxing family incomes in this 
way seriously inhibits the reallocation of female time from the household to the market 
during a period of declining fertility and therefore of falling demand for domestic labour.  
With population ageing, the present level of FTBs is therefore likely to become 
unsustainable due to productivity losses from labour supply disincentive effects.  
 
The system was also shown to be unfair. High average tax rates on the second income 
ignores the fact that of two households with the same total household income, where one 
has the second earner working entirely in the market, the other entirely in the household, 
                                                 
19 Large family benefits, as well as a high level of public investment in childcare, can be justified as a 
response to market failure. For further discussion see Apps and Rees (2005). 
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the latter will have a significantly higher standard of living because of its higher level of 
output of household goods and services.  
 
The paper proposes a return to a progressive individual income tax, with universal family 
benefits.  It also points to the need to invest in a high quality, education oriented, public 
sector childcare system.  Such investment can, in combination with a progressive 
individual income tax, be expected to be more than self-financing through the expansion 
of the tax base and from productivity gains. 
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